Contemporary Alimony by Wilson, Donald R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 11
1959
Contemporary Alimony
Donald R. Wilson
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Donald R. Wilson, Contemporary Alimony, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 782 (1959)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/11
CONTEMPORARY ALIMONY
I. INTRODUCTION
When a man loses the desire to support his wife or when the
marital relations have been dissolved, he may be compelled to
furnish support. This court enforced obligation is commonly
called "alimony". Alimony stems from the Latin word, Alimonia,
meaning "sustenance" and concerns;
... the sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced
husband. It stems from the common-law right of the wife to
support by her husband, which right, unless the wife by her
own misconduct forfeits it, continues to exist even after they
cease to live together. Alimony has as its sole object the
support of the wife, and is not to be considered a property
settlement upon a dissolution of the marriage.'
In ancient patriarchal societies where divorce was unlimited
to the husband, he was under no obligation to provide for his wife.
As culture progressed, a fixed penalty was assessed upon dissolu-
tion. In Roman law the wife was, at first, without any rights as
regards support but by the time of Justinian the guilty spouse
forfeited 100 pounds of gold.
The early church control over divorce and separation greatly
emphasized the penal character of alimony and the Anglo-Ameri-
can law of alimony is to be attributed to the persisting influence
of Reformation ideas which passed from English Ecclesiastical
courts into the common law.
In the United States, where there are 400,000 divorces granted
each year, alimony is a vital necessity. 2 The law of alimony in
this country has stood without a material change for over two
hundred years. It is the purpose of this article to discuss the
foundation for the present rule, the good and bad aspects of the
rule, and to submit suggestions for modifying the law.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. RECOGNITION in ENGLAND
In early England complete dissolution of the marital bond
was a rarity. Divorce a mensa et thoro was granted for adultery
1 Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940).
2 Judge Morris Ploscowe, Is There A Right Amount of Alimony? Coronet
Magazine, April 1955, page 140-144.
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and cruelty and this decree (commonly called divorce from bed
and board) was given in hopes of a reconciliation as marriage was
thought to be indissoluble. A divorce a vinculo matrimonii (abso-
lute divorce) could only be granted by a private act of Parliament.3
Prior to 1857 the Ecclesiastical courts exercised full jrisdiction
in matrimonial cases and this appears to be the reason for treating
marriage as indissoluble in in early England.4
The need for allowing permanent alimony became apparent
due to the requirements of the social economy of the 19th century.
The husband had the legal duty to protect and support the wife
and the modern notion of equal rights was non-existent. In grant-
ing a divorce a mensa et thoro, the Ecclesiastical courts found that
alimony was a necessity because the control exercised by the
husband over the property of the family had caused the wife to
be totally dependent on her spouse. She was not to be put into
society to subsequently become a burden of the state.
As divorce a mensa et thoro destroyed the right of cohabitation,
but not the marriage itself, the allowance of alimony was based on
the continuing duty of the husband to support the wife. Per-
manent alimony, as we know it, was never contemplated in early
England.
The broad discretionary power that today rests with the judges
also existed in English law. The needs of the wife t,he ability
of the husband to pay, and the social status of the parties were
essentially the determining factors in granting alimony. The wife
was to be allowed "a comfortable subsistence in proportion to
her husband's income."5 The punishment factor played a signifi-
cant part in allowing alimony G and the doctrine appeared to be
strictly a benefit for the innocent wife with no allowance to the
husband under any circumstances.
The passage of the English Divorce Act in 1857 allowed judicial
separation and took jurisdiction in matrimonial cases away from
the Ecclesiastical courts.7  By this time most of the American
states had already taken control of these cases from the church.
3 1 Holdsworth, A History of the English Law, page 390. The reader will
find an excellent discussion of the popularity of these private acts.
4 12 Holdsworth, A History of the English Law, page 685 (1938).
5 Kemp v. Kemp, 1 Hag.Ecc. 532, 162 Eng. Repr. 668 (1828).
6 Kemp v. Kemp, ibid, ". . it is due to the morals of society that a dis-
solute husband, who so offends (adultery) should contribute liberally to
the support of an injured wife."
7 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 (1857).
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The allowance of alimony could always be modified in England
and the Ecclesiastical judges enforced the alimony order by the
use of excommunication. After this method was forbidden by
Parliament, enforcement by contempt proceedings was substituted.s
Contempt as known in 19th century England was much the same
as we know it today in this country.
B. RECOGNITION iN A mICA
The American colonies at first treated the marital bonds much
the same as they were treated in England and marriage was thought
to be indissoluble due to the predominate influence of the church.
This feeling subsided along with the separation from English
dominance and the law of alimony in this country became very
similar to the law in England after the Act of 1857.
The American courts proceeded to give broader recognition to
the fault doctrine in allowing both divorce and alimony. This
was based on the theory that the actions of the husband are such
as would constitute a tort and therefore punishment elements
entered into the award. Alimony was also called "an assessment
of damages in favor of the wife for breach of the marriage con-
tract."9
As divorce in this country is statutory the allowance of alimony
has also become statutory. The statutes are fairly uniform in
providing for some type of temporary alimony, substantial judicial
discretion in allowing permanent alimony, and some method of
modification and enforcement.
III. THE NATURE OF ALIMONY
There are three distinct types of alimony recognized in this
country: temporary alimony or alimony pendente lite, permanent
alimony after an absolute divorce, and alimony without divorce.
A. AmnvmoN Pendente Lite
This award, often called temporary alimony, is an allowance
in support of a wife pending the divorce or separate maintenance
s 53 Geo. III c. 127 (1812-13) and 2 & 3 Win. IV c. 93 (1831-32).
9 Driskill v. Driskill, Mo. App., 181 S.W.2d 1001 (1944). See Dayton v.
Dayton, 290 Ky. 418, 161 S.W.2d 618 (1942), where the court stated:
"... . the duty and moral obligation of a husband to maintain a wife
if he is the cause of the severence of the marriage relation." See also:
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937).
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proceedings and is based on the actual duty to support which exists
because the marriage is still in effect. This allowance enables the
wife to either prosecute or defend the suit.
In granting alimony pendente lite it appears that the most
important factor considered is the financial condition of the wife
and whether or not she is able to prosecute or defend the action.
Some importance is settled on whether or not she was at fault,
but the ability of the husband to pay is seldom considered. It has
even been held that a husband suing for divorce in forma pauperis
must pay alimony pendente lite to a wife in financial need. 0
Expenses and counsel fees are usually allowed to the wife at
the court's discretion during the same proceeding in which alimony
pendente lite is granted. The husband may be ordered to pay the
attorney fees of the wife up to a reasonable amount usually set
by the court.
Temporary alimony, expenses, and counsel fees are a necessity
and should not be abolished. These allowances enable the wife,
who may be destitute, to sever the marital ties or defend the ac-
tion to the best of her ability. The only argument against the
present status of alimony pendente lite and counsel fees appears
to lie in the fact that in only a minority of the jurisdictions these
allowances are granted to the husband. Upon a proper showing
of need, the husband should be entitled to alimony pendente lite.
B. PERmA-ENT ALMONY
Although it is often stated that the granting of alimony rests
on the obligation of the husband to continue supporting the wife,
this is not truly the case as regards permanent alimony following
divorce. The marital relationship no longer exists as in alimony
pendente lite and therefore permanent alimony is awarded by
the court upon considerations of equity and public policy alone.11
The allowance of permanent alimony is a matter for the trial
court and subject to review only where an abuse of discretion is
clearly shown.12 All the states except Georgia 13 place the decision
on alimony in the hands of the trial judge.
10 Moon v. Moon, 43 N.J. Eq. 403, 3 Atl. 350 (1886). The court held that
although the husband was suing in forma pauperis he was capable of
earning some type of income and therefore should pay alimony.
11 Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y. 566, 29 N.E. 826 (1892).
12 Swolec v. Swolec, 122 Neb. 837, 241 N.W. 771 (1932).
13 Georgia places the decision on alimony in the hands of the jury.
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Although the records of the trial courts are not readily avail-
able, some of the standards used in allowing alimony appear to
be: ability of the husband to pay, financial condition of the wife
and her outside income, conduct during marriage, social status
attained during marriage, age, health, how long the marriage
existed, efforts of the wife in acquiring family wealth, children
involved, and the expectancy of the husband's future.14 Where
the wife's separate estate is sufficient to enable her to live in a
manner to which she has been accustomed, no alimony will be
allowed. 5
Permanent alimony may be awarded in a single gross sum,
a fixed amount payable in installments or a continuing allowance.
The continuing allowance theory appears to be predominant in
most of the states although it has been argued that when this
method is used the husband never knows the limits of his obliga-
tion and that there is a constant burden of "never ending" pay-
ments.
The fault principal still plays a significant part in the award-
ing of alimony although it may still be granted where both parties
are at fault.16 If the wife is primarily at fault she will ordinarily
not be allowed alimony.' 7
Enforcement of the alimony decree is done by the use of the
contempt remedy and imprisonment for contempt in these cases
does not lie within the constitutional provision prohibiting such
imprisonment for a debt.'5 Other methods of enforcement are
an injunction to prevent the husband from disposing of his prop-
erty to avoid payment' 9 and the issuance of a writ of ne exeat
to restrain the husband from leaving the state to avoid paying
alimony. The husband may have a defense in the contempt pro-
ceedings if he is totally unable to pay, although the burden is upon
him to prove such inability.2
0
14 Young v. Young, 322 Ill. 608, 154 N.E. 405 (1926), and Zimmerman v.
Zimmerman, 59 Neb. 80, 80 N.W. 643 (1899).
15 Wilkins v. Wilkins, 84 Neb. 206, 120 N.W. 907 (1909).
16 Nichols v. Nichols, 189 Ky. 500, 225 S.W. 147 (1920).
17 Ahrns v. Ahrns, 160 Ky. 342, 169 S.W. 720 (1914) and Garsed v. Garsed,
170 N.Car. 672, 87 S.E. 45 (1915).
Is Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N.E. 636 (1900), and Daniels v. Lind-
ley, 44 Iowa 567 (1876).
19 Tank v. Tank, 69 N.Dak. 39, 283 N.W. 787 (1939) and Dissette v. Dissette,
208 Ind. 567, 196 N.E. 684 (1935).
20 Snook v. Snook, 110 Wash. 310, 188 Pac. 502 (1920). On enforcement
of foreign alimony decrees see: Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909),
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C. ALImoNY WITHOUT DIVORCE
Alimony without divorce, or separate maintenance, is the al-
lowance granted a wife for the support of herself and her children
while living separate and apart from her husband without fault
of her own. It may be decreed in an action brought solely for
that purpose and is grounded on the theory that, although a wife
may have grounds to divorce her husband, she should have an
alternative remedy, namely living apart without divorce.2 1 The
causes giving rise to a suit for separate maintenance are statutory
and deal primarily with desertion although in some states the
causes are similar to those for a divorce action.
In order to receive separate maintenance the wife must be
either free of fault or at least guilty of a lesser degree of fault
than the husband.22 The amount allowed for maintenance and
support, like all types of alimony, is largely within the discretion
of the court and is subject to appellate review only if unreason-
able.23
IV. SHOULD THE LAW OF ALIMONY BE MODIFIED
OR ABOLISHED?
To abolish the-allowance of alimony entirely seems to be a
quite radical approach. Although there appear to be many de-
ficiencies in the present status of the law, society should not be
required to support the dependent spouse who, upon dissolution
of the marriage, is unable to support herself. It was upon this
basis that alimony was first allowed to the wife. The wife was
at one time entirely dependent upon the husband, but conditions
have greatly changed and the various equal rights movements
have greatly improved the wife's position. It is because of these
changes in society that the present law of alimony has been
where it was held that a final alimony decree in a foreign state was
entitled to full faith and credit. This case represents the weight of
authority on alimony decrees and the present tendency appears to be
in discarding the finality requirement. See: Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944), where it was held that a foreign state may
look into the validity of the decree given in a sister state.
21 Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 43 N.W. 118 (1889) and Decker v. Decker,
56 Mont. 338, 185 Pac. 168 (1919).
22 Price v. Price, 75 Neb. 552, 106 N.W. 657 (1909) and Snouffer v. Snouffer,
150 Iowa 58, 129 N.W. 326 (1911) dealing with those situations where
both parties are at fault and the wife's fault is equal to, or greater
than, the husband's.
23 Fountain v. Fountain, 150 Ga. 742, 105 S.E. 294 (1920).
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criticized. The purpose of this section is to discuss the arguments
both for and against the modification of the present law, along
with some of the limitations now in existence in the various states.
A. ARGU-ENTS FOR ALmmONY.
The main argument for allowing alimony, as before men-
tioned, is to keep the burden of supporting the dependent spouse
from falling upon society as a whole. Although the wife may
stand on nearly an equal footing in most cases there are still
many instances where one spouse is unable to support herself
or through her efforts appears entitled to an award of alimony.
The wife may have devoted her time exclusively to household
chores and is therefore unprepared to set out on her own, she
may have greatly contributed to the ability of her husband to
earn a large income, and illness or physical injury may prevent
her from adequately supporting herself. In these cases, along
with others (such as mental illness cases)2 4 alimony serves a dis-
tinct purpose and is a necessity.
B. ARGUMNTS AGAINST ALvmoNY
The wife is no longer dependent upon the husband com-
pletely and as the present law of alimony is based upon the
economic conditions during that period when she was totally
dependent, it should be abolished or modified to conform with
present economic standards. The married woman is now per-
mitted to hold most any type of job, hold property independently
of her husband, enter into contractual relations independently
or with him, and she may be sued and sue in her own name.
She is liable for her own wrongs and she may vote without her
husband's supervision. She is no longer obliged to "love, honor
and obey" and the law may not compel her to do any of these.
In this era she attains a social status quite equal with the hus-
band in both civic and piiblic affairs. Marital dissolution has
become a natural remedy and a woman living an independent
life does not at all shock society. This comparative ease with
which a woman may support herself lends itself to the conclu-
sion that the husband should not be compelled to support her
after divorce.
24 Nearly all of the jurisdictions in this country provide some type of sup-
port in the case of the divorced, insane spouse. However, only a very
few of these states include this provision in that section of the statutes
dealing with divorce and alimony.
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Society is causing the divorce requirements to become more
lenient and there should be a comparative modification to restrict
the law of alimony. If the grass appears greener on the other
side of the fence it is easy for the wife to get a divorce, along
with substantial alimony. This may tend to cause a hasty, emo-
tional wife to permanently sever any possibility of reconciliation
in hopes of "getting back at her spouse", through a recovery of
alimony. If the right to alimony were limited, her opportunity
to "get back" at her husband would be delayed and hence, a
reconciliation may occur.
Alimony can be used as a method of blackmail and extor-
tion for those women who are able to trap men into the bonds
of matrimony for just that purpose. It also tends to increase
or continue former antagonisms and it has often provoked those
who are ordered to pay it to leave their job, residence, leave
the state, and disappear forever. This maintains a distasteful
link with the dissolved partnership and is a type of penal servi-
tude that transposes lost affection into ready cash.
C. METHODS OF MODIFICATION OR LIvITATION Now IN USE
1. Alimony for the Husband?
Until the last quarter of a century alimony was a privilege
enjoyed strictly by the wife alone. 25 It was felt that the hus-
band could always provide for himself and no exception was
made for the physically disabled husband with a wealthy wife.
One of the first states to allow alimony to the husband was
Illinois in 1935 and since that time approximately eighteen other
states grant the husband alimony in some form.26 The basis
25 Sommers v. Sommers, 39 Kan. 132, 17 Pac. 841 (1888) and Green v.
Green, 49 Neb. 546, 68 N.W. 947 (1896).
26 These states allow alimony to the husband: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 56-5-13 (1949); California Civ. Code Ann. § 137 (Supp. 1953); Iowa
Code c. 598, § 598.19 (1950); Maine Rev. Stat. c. 166, § 66 (1954); Massa-
chusetts Gen. Laws c. 208, § 34 (1932); Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 42-318.01
(1943) insanity only; New Hampshire Rev. Laws c. 399, § 19 (1942);
North Dakota Rev. Code § 14-0524; Ohio Code Ann. § 8003-17 (Supp.
1952); Oklahoma Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §§ 1278 and 1284 (1937); Oregon
Comp. Laws Ann. § 107.100 (1935); Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. tit. 23
§ 45-47, insanity only (Purdon 1955); Utah Code Ann. § 30-4-4 (1943);
Vermont Rev. Stat. § 3247-adultery of wife, § 3209-insanity, § 3230-
temporary alimony (1947); West Virginia Code Ann. § 4715; Virginia
Code § 20-107-similar to property division (1950); Wisconsin Stat.
§ 247.27 - for child support only (1949); Washington Rev. Code § 26.08.110
- similar to property division (1951). In all of these jurisdictions it is
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for this trend lies in the fact that if alimony is to be an economic
necessity, elderly and disabled husbands are just as apt to be
put on the public assistance rolls as is a divorced woman. Where
alimony is allowed to the husband it is always necessary for
him to prove extenuating circumstances and records show that
his chances of a sizable recovery appear to be less than that of
the wife. All the jurisdictions except Alabama, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey and North Carolina have some type of statute allowing
either alimony for the husband or which give the court a broad
discretion in, distribution of the property. Courts have still been
slow in distributing property to the husband unless there is a
specific statute allowing him a distribution in lieu of alimony.
2. Community Property?
The second theory offered as a possible solution to the ali-
mony problem lies in the acceptance of the Community Property
theory. Under this principle the community of gains during the
marital status are divided upon dissolution of the marriage. Each
party retains the property held before the marriage ceremony
and thus the matrimonial period is viewed in a more business-
like manner. As the contribution of the wife to the enrichment
of the family is difficult to adjust, the simple splitting of the
assets acquired during the marriage and less emphasis on per-
manent alimony has been suggested to be the most equitable
result. Under this system the wife in the home, who is unable
to go outside to earn money, would not have the feeling of be-
ing a liability rather than an asset. Where the earnings, income,
and assets of the two are vested jointly during the marriage,
a real economic, as well as conjugal, parnership results.
The true community or partnership idea seems a practical
and simple method of giving each spouse a sense of security,
reward, accomplishment, and justice. Neither spouse should lose
the ownership of his part, accumulated by the efforts during
marriage, because of a failure to live up to the emotional side
of marriage. Personal ownership of this type serves as a stabil-
izer for the individual and for society. Thrifty spouses may be,
kept together because of their financial interest in the status of
marriage. This type of financial concern appears to be the grow-
necessary for the husband to prove extenuating circumstances whichjustify his receipt of alimony. Most courts have still been slow in even
distributing property to the husband unless there is a specific statute
allowing him alimony.
COMMENTS
ing and progressive view towards the marriage contract. The
possibility of burdening the state with the support of one of the
parting spouses would be greatly diminished if that spouse could
be certain of an equitable split of the property.
In answer to those who suggest that community property
would allow us to do away with the law of alimony entirely it
is submitted that in the overwhelming majority of divorce cases
a division of property would not be sufficient to provide for a
destitute wife. In most of the divorce cases the amount of prop-
erty is so small that any division would not enable either spouse
to maintain adequate support for himself. The following chart,
taken from After Divorce, by Goode reveals the startling facts
as to the average amount of property upon dissolution of the
marriage: 2 7
Total Value of Property At Time of Divorce
Value Percent
No property 40
$1.00-$ 249 5
$ 250-$ 999 16
$1000-$1999 14
$2000-$3999 8
$4000- and over 18
Total 101
N = 425
The results of this study show that the community property
theory alone, would be an incomplete substitute for alimony and
only the high middle class and wealthy families would derive any
benefit whatsoever from an acceptance of the community prop-
erty theory.
3. Modification of the Decree?
Another method of limitation used by the courts to keep
alimony awards equitable lies in the retainment of jurisdiction
to modify or halt the payments. This right of modification is ac-
cepted by the overwhelming majority of the states. The logic
behind the rule is not hard to comprehend. Changing conditions
27 Goode, After Divorce, page 217. This study was taken from a sub-
stantial number of divorced women living in and around the Detroit,
Michigan area. This book also contains an excellent discussion and
many surveys on the social and economic conditions of the divorced
spouse.
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may make it hard to meet the obligation and thus cause extreme
hardship and as recovery is based on economic need and ability
to pay, the award must be changed when these two elements
are altered.
This power should not be taken away from the court's dis-
cretion as it serves as an ever present equitable safeguard.
4. Alimony Based on Fault?
A further limitation of the right to alimony is imposed in
those states that refuse recovery where the recipient is the guilty
party in the divorce action.28  In those jurisdictions that accept
the "fault principle", alimony is considered basically a punish-
ment and hence, no alimony is granted where there is no need
for punishment.
This type of limitation should be abolished. It combines
the emotional and financial aspects of the marriage and as ali-
mony is, and should be, based entirely on an economical founda-
tion, this is an unrealistic approach to the problem.
5. A Percentage Limitation?
A very few states have recognized still another limitation
by restricting the amount of recovery to not more than one-
third of the income and property of the obligor spouse.29  The
reason for using the one-third limitation appears to be founded
in the old common law right of dower whereby the wife had
the one-third interest in the property of her husband upon his
death. This method is quite equitable and although most of the
awards made in alimony cases do not exceed the one-third limit,
even in the absence of a statute, some definite limitation should
be set. The changed circumstances of the wife again enter into
discussion and it is argued that in nearly all cases a divorced
spouse is able to support herself on this one-third allowance
plus her own income. Pennsylvania, which has done away with
permanent alimony except where one spouse is insane, has re-
stricted even this allowance to one-third of the income and prop-
2s Some of those states that rely heavily on the "fault doctrine", in both
statutes and decisions, are: Deleware, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
29 Those states that use the one-third limitation are: Arkansas, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, which allows alimony only
in case of an insane spouse.
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erty of the other spouse. Thus, it appears that a one-third al-
lowance is sufficient in all cases. A higher amount puts too great
a burden and penalty on the obligor spouse.
6. Method of Payment
The final limtiation controversy lies in the different methods
of payment allowed in the various jurisdictions. Although the
periodic payment method provides continuing support to the des-
titute spouse, the extent of the husband's obligation is never de-
termined. He is at all times subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts. If a lump sum is decreed the judgment is final and both
parties are subsequently on their own. Those who favor the
periodic payment system argue that a lump sum award can work
-a hardship on either party. If the wife should become sick and
unable to support herself at all, her payments have been ad-
vanced and she is entitled to no more. Therefore she will even-
tually become a burden on society. The periodic payment ap-
proach also protects society against the spendthrift spouse who
quickly spends the lump sum allowance. After a lump sum
award has been decreed what happens if the obligee spouse im-
mediately marries? The obligor is not allowed to plead this
in an effort to recover the monies advanced and he has enriched
his former spouse and her new husband by order of the court.
It is submitted that the best method of payment is a lump sum
award payable in installments. This system determines the ex-
tent of the husband's obligation, protects against the spendthrift
wife, and suffices as a temporary aid in starting the wife (or
husband) on the road to acquiring the ability of self-support.
V. CONCLUSION.
The research and preparation of this article has yielded the
following conclusions and suggestions:
1. Some form of alimony is a necessity. The burden of support-
ing the destitute divorced spouse must not fall upon society.
Although the duty to support is, in reality, ended after the
divorce, the time spent together in furthering the family
unity should entitle the wife or husband, as the case may be,
to some form of compensation upon dissolution of the mar-
riage, at least until the obligee spouse is in a position to com-
pletely support himself.
2. The granting of alimony must not be taken from the discre-
tion of the trial court. Each case presents a different situa-
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tion and the needs and abilities of the parties is never the
same, hence, each situation must be judged with a complete
knowledge of the facts. No stringent rules of procedure are
practicable in this area and each case must be decided with
due regard to the particular condition of the parties.
3. The court must be able to modify the original decree at all
times. Changing circumstances most certainly require this
remedy and if it is not provided unreasonable hardships may
arise.
4. Neither alimony pendente lite nor permanent alimony should
be restricted to the wife only. It is the recent trend in this
country to grant alimony to either spouse upon a proper show-
ing of need. Although only a minority of the jurisdictions
grant alimony to the husband, those that do have accepted
the better rule. In early England alimony to the husband was
unheard of, but the changing position of the wife has made
it much easier for her to provide self-support. Why should
the independently wealthy wife escape the burden of provid-
ing for her needy spouse upon dissolution of the marriage?
It is just as easy for him to becoine a ward of the state.
5. Such yardsticks as: "fault", "guilt", "clean hands" and "in-
nocent spouse" should be abolished. These ecclesiastical yard-
sticks disregard the true economical basis for the law of ali-
mony. Economic need should be the only yardstick and the
punishment theory has no place in this phase of domestic
relations law. The emotional and financial aspects of divorce
law should be separated and the tendency to punish fault and
reward virtue should be halted.
Regardless of what method is used to provide for the desti-
tute spouse, a more "business-like" approach to the financial situ-
ation of the parties should b.e used. The real quesitons are first,
whether the family can be rehabilitated; second, if the family is
finished, what can be done for the children; and lastly, what type
of an equitable distribution can be made for the support of the
spouses.
Donald R. Wilson 60
